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Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions
Multi-Object Auctions Spectrum Auctions
2015/9/18
We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value
synergies. First, we estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants of final auction prices.
This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) from July 1994 to May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multipleround auctions in which collec...
Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
games group decisions bidding: auctions
2015/9/18
We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe. Specifically, we compute a unique point in the core that minimizes the sum of squared devi...
Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services
Wireless Services Enhance Competition
2015/9/18
Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for
wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance
of competition, not only in the auction but als...
The simultaneous ascending auction has proved to be a successful method of auctioning
many related items. Simultaneous sale and ascending bids promote price discovery,
which helps bidders build de...
This paper describes the bid signaling that occurred in many of the FCC
spectrum auctions. Bidders in these auctions bid on numerous spectrum licenses
simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on ...
Spectrum Auctions
Spectrum Auctions price
2015/9/18
Auctions have emerged as the primary means of assigning spectrum licenses to
companies wishing to provide wireless communication services. Since July 1994, the
Federal Communications Commission (F...
Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions
Auctions Collusion Multiple Object Auctions Spectrum Auctions
2015/9/18
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous
ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses
simultaneously, with bidding remaining ope...
Multi-Object Auctions with Resale: Theory and Experiment
Multi-object Auctions Vickrey Second-Price Package Resale
2015/9/18
We study multi-object auctions in the presence of post-auction trade
opportunities among bidders who have either single- or multi-object demand. We
focus on two formats: Vickrey auctions where pac...
Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction
Liquidity Needs reverse auction
2015/9/18
We report the results of an experimental test of alternative auction designs suitable for pricing
and removing troubled assets from banks’ balance sheets as part of the financial rescue
planned by...
We analyze the implications of different pricing rules in discrete clock
auctions. The two most common pricing rules are highest-rejected bid
(HRB) and lowest-accepted bid (LAB). Under HRB, the wi...
This paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first price auctions overbidding with respect to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium might be driven
from anticipated loser regret...
We perform laboratory experiments comparing auctions with endogenous budget constraints. A
principal imposes a budget limit on a bidder (an agent) in response to a principal-agent problem.
In cont...
The Effciency of Real-World Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions
Bargaining incomplete information Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem
2015/7/21
This study quanti es the eciency of a real-world bargaining game with two-sided incomplete information. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Williams (1987) derived the theoretical ecient frontier
...
Equilibria in Second Price Auctions with Information Acquisition
second price auctions information acquisition heterogenous bidders the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
2010/7/2
This paper studies equilibria in second price auctions with information acquisition in an independent private value setting. We focus on the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the information ...