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Mechanism Design for Route Allocation in Multiple-commodity Network
mechanism design strategy proof minmax delay
2016/1/22
We consider the problem of allocating routes in multiple-commodity networks. In such networks, a user can directly download the ‘desired file from a server, or she can do this via a indirectly route t...
Mechanism Design and Implementation for Lung Exchange
Mechanism Design Implementation Lung Exchange
2016/1/22
We explore the mechanism design problem for lung exchange and its implementation in practice. We prove that determining whether there exists a non-trivial solution of the lung exchangeproblem is NP-co...
Mechanism Design for Resource Allocation with Applications to Centralized Multi-Commodity Routing
mechanism design strategyproof resource allocation net- work routing
2016/1/22
We formulate and study the algorithmic mechanism design problem for a general class of resource allocation settings,where the center redistributes the private resources brought by individuals. Money t...
Multidimensional Mechanism Design:Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly
extreme point faces non-linear pricing monopoly pricing multi-dimensional screening incentive compatibility adverse selection mechanism design
2015/9/23
The seller of N distinct objects is uncertain about the buyer’s valuation for those objects. The seller’s problem, to maximize expected revenue, consists of maximizing a linear functional over a conve...
Auction Mechanism Design in Wholesale Electricity Market Considering Impacts of Long-term Contract
long-term contract wholesale electricity market
2014/11/27
In wholesale electricity market, a generator with cost information advantage will submit a bid higher than its true cost, which may reduce the market efficiency. To solve this problem, this article de...
Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
Asymmetric information stochastic processes incentives mechanism design envelope theorems
2014/9/9
We study mechanism design in dynamic quasilinear environments where private information arrives over time and decisions are made over multiple periods. We make three contributions. First, we provide a...
Budget Feasible Mechanism Design:From Prior-Free to Bayesian
Mechanism design, budget feasible, prior-free, Bayesian, submodular, subadditive, approximation
2012/12/3
Budget feasible mechanism design studies procurement combinatorial auctions in which the sellers have private costs to produce items, and the buyer (auctioneer) aims to maxi mize a social valuation fu...